REBUTTAL TESTIMONY

of

Mike Luth Rate Analyst

Rates Department Financial Analysis Division Illinois Commerce Commission

Petition for approval of delivery services tariffs and tariff revisions and of residential delivery services implementation plan and for approval of certain other amendments and additions to its rates, terms and conditions.

Commonwealth Edison Company

Docket No. 01-0423

October 16, 2001

Witness Identification

- 1 Q. Please state your name and business address.
- 2 A. Mike Luth, Illinois Commerce Commission, 527 East Capitol Avenue,
- 3 Springfield, Illinois 62701.
- 4 Q. Are you the same Mike Luth who pre-filed direct testimony in this docket, which
- 5 was identified as ICC Staff Exhibit 6.0?
- 6 A. Yes, I am.

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Introduction to Testimony

- 7 Q. What is the subject matter of this rebuttal testimony?
- 8 A. There are four major subjects covered in this testimony:
- To reply to Commonwealth Edison ("Edison") rebuttal testimony and
 Department of Energy ("DOE") direct testimony that favors a marginal
 Cost of Service Study ("COSS") over an embedded COSS,
 - To reply to Edison rebuttal testimony and DOE direct testimony that suggests that delivery services rates should be based upon ratcheted demand billing units rather than unratcheted demand billing units,
 - 3. To reply to the City of Chicago, People of the State of Illinois, Cook County State's Attorney's Office and the Citizens Utility Board (collectively "GC") direct testimony proposing a 4 Coincident Peak ("4CP") allocation factor for demand-related cost of service instead of a Non-coincident peak ("NCP") demand allocation factor, and
 - 4. To comment on the burdens discussed by Edison rebuttal testimony in implementing a High-voltage rate and demand rates carried out to five decimal places.
- 25 Q. Are you sponsoring any schedules as part of your testimony?

26 A. Yes, I am.

Α.

Schedule 1 Cost of Service and Rate Design

Marginal COSS vs. Embedded COSS

- Q. Please review your reasons for supporting an embedded COSS instead of
 Edison's marginal COSS.
 - The embedded COSS is a better match in designing rates to recover an embedded delivery services revenue requirement than Edison's marginal COSS. Edison's proposed rates, based upon its marginal COSS, do not properly take load diversity within each customer class into consideration, which would be an important price signal that a prospective customer within a given rate class might have control over. Edison's marginal COSS shows that the cost per kW varies within each rate class according to the location of a customer, where the location is defined by the kilovoltampere (kVA) load density per square mile. The variation in costs is sometimes considerable, as described in my direct testimony. The result of not basing rates upon the location of a customer is that the price signals sent by Edison's marginal COSS are blunted because there is no incentive for a prospective customer to locate in a lower-cost area.

The embedded COSS is a better match for the recovery of an embedded revenue requirement because it is based upon actual costs and actual customer behavior. I agree with the intervenor witnesses who describe

"marginal" costs determined by Edison's marginal COSS as replacement costs. Indexed inflation of costs to connect a customer to the distribution system does not measure the costs of incremental or marginal use of the distribution system, because the customers being measured are existing, not marginal, customers. The inflation of costs for equipment already in place does not represent marginal costs because the equipment is already in place. It is more appropriate to design delivery services rates based upon an embedded COSS because the fairness of rates resulting from the actual costs chargeable to a class of customers overrides the alleged, but unproven, efficiency of rates resulting from the inflation of equipment costs already in place.

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Q. What is your reply to Company witness Makholm's claim that you "forget that the prime distinction between embedded cost and marginal cost concepts in ratemaking is the ability of the latter to send correct price signals, i.e. to promote the *consumer rationing* function of a sound rate structure." (ComEd Ex. 34.0, p. 11, I. 270-273)

Most likely unwittingly, Dr. Makholm explains why a marginal COSS is inappropriate for delivery services. In attempting to explain how a marginal COSS signals the resources that will be consumed – looking forward – by a delivery services customer's desire to take services, Dr. Makholm states that embedded costs will not be affected by these decisions of consumers, *at the margin*, to take delivery services or not. (ComEd Ex. 34.0, p. 11, I. 276-278)

Dr. Makholm then further contradicts his criticism of an embedded COSS when he says that 'embedded costs remain whether or not consumers buy ComEd's services." (ComEd Ex. 34.0, p. 11, l. 280 and 281) If, as Dr. Makholm states, embedded costs are not affected, at the margin, by a customer's decision to take delivery services or not, and embedded costs remain regardless of whether a customer takes delivery services, then marginal activity does not apparently cause delivery services costs. If marginal activity does not reflect cost causation, then cost causation is not reflected in Edison's marginal COSS. Since the delivery services rates are to be designed to recover an embedded revenue requirement, it is appropriate that an embedded COSS is used to design those rates.

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Is Dr. Makholm correct in concluding that your statements are wrong that an embedded COSS measures the costs of the delivery services equipment in place resulting from the activities of the various classes of customers?

No, he is not. As explained previously, some of the points that Dr. Makholm attempts to make are contradictory. He takes issue with my statement that embedded costs are the result of the activities of the various classes of customers. In his zeal to promote pricing based upon what he terms "forward-looking" delivery services costs, he states that embedded costs remain whether or not consumers buy ComEd's services (Id, lines 264-269 and lines 279-281). Dr. Makholm's explanation ignores the activities that necessitated 100% of those costs in the first place, which is customer demand. Without

customer demand for delivery services, the embedded costs that Dr. Makholm dismisses as irrelevant to the concept of cost causation would not be necessary because there would be no need to build a distribution system.

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Dr. Makholm also ignores the probability that delivery services customers will continue to demand delivery services in the near-future at a level similar to the demand in the recent past. The test year concept is based upon a reasonable expectation that near-term delivery services costs will be similar to those in the recent past because customer behavior is not expected to vary substantially. Dr. Makholm's confusing rejection of customer activity causing the embedded delivery services costs under review in this docket is not persuasive in favor of Edison's marginal COSS. Dr. Makholm's position also ignores the fairness of charging customers based upon their activities that caused those embedded costs.

In arguing against distinguishing between new and existing customers, the Panel Rebuttal Testimony of Edison witnesses Alongi and Kelly indicate that, in the long-term view, each customer's contribution to ComEd's peak level of demand causes ComEd to incur costs when one more customer is added or one more kilowatt is demanded of the system. (ComEd Ex. 32.0, p. 7, l. 136-143) Do these comments support the use of a marginal COSS?

No, the comments support the use of an embedded COSS to determine rates designed to recover the embedded revenue requirement in this docket. As

equipment is added to the Edison distribution system because of additional demand, be it from existing or new customers, the embedded revenue requirement will change. At the time that Edison is no longer earning a reasonable and fair rate of return on its investment in distribution plant-inservice, new rates can be designed based upon the updated embedded revenue requirement in a future delivery services rate case. Mr. Alongi and Ms. Kelly's comments demonstrate that the continuing activities of customers, through the customers' combined demand for delivery services, cause the costs of the distribution system.

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- 119 Q. Are you proposing different rates for delivery services customers within the 120 same rate class, depending upon whether the customers are new or existing? 121 Α. No, I am not. The section of my direct testimony that Edison Panel witnesses 122 Alongi and Kelly reference is meant to show that the price signals indicated by 123 Edison's marginal COSS are minimized. It is more appropriate for the 124 delivery services charges that a customer class will pay to be based upon the 125 demand that the customer class places on the distribution system, as is 126 reflected in an embedded COSS, rather than an averaging of inflated 127 distribution system costs based upon an index, as is reflected in Edison's 128 marginal COSS.
- 129 Q. Please clarify your assertion concerning hypothetical costs being reflected in 130 Edison's marginal COSS, which Edison panel witnesses Alongi and Kelly

- 131 characterize as current costs of distribution facilities (ComEd Ex. 32.0, p. 10,
- 132 lines 209-214).
- 133 A. The current costs in the marginal COSS are hypothetical in that the costs are
- inflated by an index, rather than representing the actual costs of the equipment
- that is included in the embedded revenue requirement to be determined in this
- docket.
- 137 Q. United States Department of Energy witness Dr. Swan favors a marginal
- 138 COSS over an embedded COSS based upon his belief that economic
- efficiency is improved with a marginal COSS (Direct Testimony of Dr. Dale E.
- Swan, pp. 5-6, l. 92-103). Assuming the clients that Dr. Swan represents are
- in the over 10,000 kW delivery services class, which is the largest proposed
- customer class, what is the class revenue requirement for the over 10,000 kW
- delivery services class under the marginal COSS compared to the embedded
- 144 COSS?
- 145 A. The over 10,000 kW class has a delivery services revenue requirement of
- \$60.1 million under Edison's marginal COSS (ComEd Ex. 13.1, p. 3),
- 147 compared to \$76.7 million under Edison's embedded COSS (Edison reply to
- Staff data request ML-1). The \$16.6 million difference would be left to other
- delivery services customers. The value of Dr. Swan's counsel to the
- 150 Commission of his preference for a marginal COSS under the banner of
- economic efficiency is a bit tempered by the self-interest that his counsel
- serves.

Under Edison's embedded COSS, the over 10,000 kW class would pay approximately \$.00741 per kWh compared to \$.0367 per kWh for the single family without space heat. (Id.) The over 10,000 kW class would pay just over 1/5th of the per-kWh delivery services rate. The High-voltage rate or credit for the over 10,000 class reduces the per-kWh rate for those customers further. Even though the over 10,000 kW delivery services customer class is billed per kW of demand compared to the per-kWh consumption rate for residential customers, the per-kWh rate indicates that the embedded COSS provides relief to the clients represented by Dr. Swan for their high-volume use of the distribution system in the form of a substantially lower rate.

4CP Allocation Factor vs. NCP Allocation Factor

- Q. Should demand-related charges be based upon the 4-month Coincident Peak

 ("4CP") allocation factor recommended by City of Chicago, People of the

 State of Illinois, Cook County State's Attorney Office and Citizens Utility Board

 witness Bodmer (GC Exhibit 1.0, pp. 60-71, I. 1179-1388) instead of the Non
 coincident Peak ("NCP") allocation factor used in your embedded COSS?

 No, it should not. As Mr. Bodmer mentions, there is no perfect system-wide

 allocation factor for demand-related delivery services costs. (Id., p. 67, I.
 - allocation factor for demand-related delivery services costs. (Id., p. 67, I. 1312-1327) The NCP can be viewed as a measure of the potential contribution of each customer class to cost causation because the sum of the NCP for all customer classes represents the capacity of the distribution system that stands by to serve the electrical demand of all customers at any given

time. While the entire distribution system is not sized to meet the sum of NCP for all customer classes at the same time, some elements of it are sized to meet localized peak demands, as explained by Edison witness Born (ComEd Ex. 37.0, pp. 47, l. 66-125). Efforts to downsize the capacity, and cost, of elements of the distribution system according to system-wide peak demands, rather than the sum of the peaks of all customer classes, represent cost savings in meeting the projected peak for all customers, but should not represent a method of determining the costs of the entire distribution system caused by each class of customers. While not perfect, NCP is a fair measure of the use of the distribution system by each class of customers, and is therefore a fair measure of determining rates for that use.

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- Do you agree with Edison witness Heintz' revision of his embedded COSS which allocates the costs of High-voltage equipment to the customer classes according to a 1CP method? (ComEd Ex. 33.0, p. 4, I. 94-108)
- 188 Α. Yes, I do. Mr. Heintz' revision is supported in the rebuttal testimony of Edison 189 witness Born, an engineer. (ComEd Ex. 37.0, p. 5, line 79-87). 190 reasonable to expect that high-voltage equipment is not sized according to the 191 sum of localized peak demands over several points in time in a given year. 192 The costs for high-voltage equipment, which is used in less of a localized 193 manner and more in a system-wide manner, should be allocated according to 194 the contribution of each customer class to the system-wide peak, as is fairly 195 represented by a 1CP allocation factor. The use of a 1CP allocation factor for

High-voltage distribution substations and High-voltage distribution lines is reflected in Schedule 1 attached to this rebuttal testimony.

Rate Design - Ratcheted vs. Unratcheted Demand Billing Units

- 198 Q. Do Edison panel rebuttal witnesses Clair and Crumrine (ComEd Ex. 31.0, pp.
- 199 10-12, I. 227-273) accept your proposal to design demand-metered rates
- based upon unratcheted billing units?
- 201 A. No, they do not. They continue to push for demand-metered rates based upon
- ratcheted billing units. They state that they believe ratcheted rates are
- 203 appropriately responsive to changes in demand resulting from efficiency
- improvements or slumped business conditions.
- 205 Q. Are their arguments persuasive?

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206 No, they are not. In reply to the concern that a customer's bill would not be Α. 207 reduced if slumped business conditions resulted in reduced demand, Edison 208 panel witnesses Clair and Crumrine express their agreement with Department 209 of Energy witness Swan's analogy comparing a demand ratchet with a lease 210 for real estate. (Id., p. 11, I. 233-243) Dr. Swan's analogy stated that the cost 211 of a real estate lease would not be reduced if a change in business conditions 212 resulted in a need for less space. Possible renegotiation of the business 213 lease aside, another analogy would be using a service station to partially fill a 214 delivery truck's fuel tank. A demand ratchet would charge the delivery truck for

the annual high of, for example, 100 gallons of fuel taken 9 months ago, even if,

at the present time, the delivery truck takes only 15 gallons. Standard procedure, of course, would charge the delivery truck for only 15 gallons, since that was all that was taken. As a source of energy delivery, the distribution system is a closer analogy to a service station than a real estate lease, but the difference in treatment of a customer indicates that analogies are not always illustrative and can be used to show different sides of a given issue.

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Edison witnesses Clair and Crumrine also state that a billing ratchet provides more of an economic incentive to install efficiency improvements. This would be the case if the demand ratchet is considerably higher than average demand and the efficiency improvements reduced the demand ratchet by a greater percentage than average demand. If the potential efficiency improvements reduced peak demand only slightly, however, while significantly reducing average demand over the course of 11 months, the customer's demand billing would be affected only to a small degree because the demand ratchet based upon peak demand would change only slightly. If the demand ratchet did not change sufficiently to make the improvements financially beneficial to the customer, the improvements would probably not be made. To the extent that a demand-ratcheted customer peaked during a non-summer month, any extra reliability contributed to the distribution system during high distribution demand summer months because of the potential efficiency improvements would be lost.

Q. Are the demand charges in Edison's bundled rates billed according to a demand ratchet?

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No, demand charges under bundled rates are billed according to the monthly demand reading as opposed to a ratcheted demand charge based upon the maximum demand reading over the past 12 months. In rejecting ARES coalition witness Dr. Ulrich's proposal that Edison's rate structure be realigned by voltage level, Edison panel rebuttal witnesses Clair and Crumrine state that Dr. Ulrich's proposal would "completely upset the apple cart . . ." (Edison Ex. 31.0, p. 23, l. 515) Edison panel rebuttal witnesses Clair and Crumrine do not apply the same criticism to Edison's proposal in this docket to base demandrelated delivery services charges upon a demand ratchet, although the "apple cart would be upset" because Edison's proposal represents a change in the method of billing for demand-related charges. Customer comparison of delivery services charges, which would include the charges for the purchase of power from an ARES, with bundled rates would be complicated by the difference in billing approaches. Billing for demand-related charges based upon a billing ratchet would also affect Edison's billing system, with the requirement that the current month's demand be compared to monthly demands over the past 12 months. As explained in my direct testimony and reiterated here in rebuttal testimony, Edison's proposed demand ratchet for delivery services suffers from the same problems discussed in the Commission's Order in the previous Edison delivery services docket where the demand ratchet was rejected. (Order, Docket No. 99-0117, pp. 58-64)

High-voltage Rate Design

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Q. What is your assessment of the description of your proposed high-voltage rate as burdensome and confusing in the panel rebuttal testimony of Edison witnesses Clair and Crumrine? (ComEd Ex. 31.0, pp. 25-26, l. 569-589)

It is difficult to determine why a single separate rate for high-voltage service points is more burdensome and confusing than a credit that represents a discount from full-price demand charges. If I were a high-voltage customer and it was explained to me that I would be billed according to a "Gross" demand charge reduced by a "High-voltage credit", my reaction would be to ask "What do I pay?" A single separate high-voltage rate would eliminate that sequence for the customer, and the amount to be paid for service from high-voltage delivery points would be clearer than a billing system obscured by a "Gross" charge minus a "Credit."

With respect to a burden placed on Edison, the burden may have to do with changing the bill presentation to describe the high-voltage line as a rate rather than a credit, and changing the calculation of the total bill from a gross demand charge minus a high-voltage credit to a low-voltage demand charge plus a high-voltage demand charge. This would not seem to be any more of a burden than making the necessary inputs to change the delivery services rates that will likely result from the Commission's Order in this docket.

Rate Design Billing Constraints

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- Q. Did you place any constraints on the number of decimal points in the delivery services rates that you proposed in direct testimony?
- 281 Α. Yes, I did. Contrary to the comment in the panel rebuttal testimony of Edison 282 witnesses Alongi and Kelly stating that I did not apply any billing system 283 constraints, (ComEd Ex. 32.0, p. 26, l. 547 through 549) I limited all demand-284 related rates to five decimal places, which is the same number of decimal 285 places proposed in Edison's proposed per-kWh delivery services rates for 286 those customers not served by demand meters. A higher number of decimal 287 places minimizes rounding problems in class revenue recovery. The form of 288 my proposed fixed monthly customer charges is the same as Edison's, being 289 carried out to two decimal places, or dollars and cents.

Similar to the criticisms concerning a single high-voltage rate compared to a "Gross" demand charge minus a high-voltage credit, it is difficult to understand how additional decimal places contained in a delivery services rate imposes a significant burden on Edison's billing system. Edison will be required to make changes to its billing systems to install revised and new delivery services rates resulting from the Commission's Order in this docket. Edison's billing system should have the ability to accommodate five decimal places for demand rates, given that the per-kWh rates are carried out to five decimal places.

- 298 Q. Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?
- 299 A. Yes, it does.

TEST YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2000

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	Allocator	Total ICC	Single Family w/o SH	Single Family w/SH	Multi Family w/o SH	Multi Family w/SH	GS No Demand	GS <u>0-25 kw</u>	GS <u>26-100 kw</u>	GS 101-400 kw	GS 401-800 kw
ADDITIONS 1 Illinois Electricity Distribution Tax 2 System Black Start	KWH-ALL KWH-ALL	88,119,175 361,878	17,924,752 73,611	1,025,428 4,211	3,749,478 15,398	1,855,386 7,619	700,189 2,875	3,619,375 14,864	6,913,579 28,392	10,130,796 41,604	8,057,086 33,088
3 TOTAL COST OF SERVICE (Revenue-Re	elated Undistributed)	1,494,140,980 1,494,140,980	551,057,604	21,217,832	154,527,908	49,231,571	19,566,892	66,633,780	96,622,817	127,073,457	89,395,231
DEMAND-RELATED COST OF SERVIC (Reduced for Other Revenues)	Е										
4 High Voltage ESS 5 High Voltage Dist. Substations 6 High Voltage Dist. Lines 7 Distribution Substations 8 Distribution Lines 9 Line Transformers 10 Uncollectible Accounts 11 Revenue-related Illinois Electricity Distribution Tax and 12 System Black Start		11,623,764 237,783,694 33,365,269 100,514,894 612,430,755 68,954,429 8,292,914 (12,268,872) 88,481,053	0 75,571,167 10,603,975 33,728,423 205,505,104 23,285,087 1,741,616 (4,121,861) 17,998,363	0 2,111,805 296,324 1,707,958 10,406,478 1,179,123 149,191 (180,271) 1,029,640	0 15,445,566 2,167,287 6,167,179 37,576,221 4,257,634 3,443,930 (824,912) 3,764,876	0 3,971,635 557,291 3,772,759 22,987,176 2,604,599 759,574 (396,847) 1,863,006	0 2,368,713 332,372 870,539 5,304,138 600,994 55,403 (117,526) 703,065	0 11,628,006 1,631,615 4,261,023 25,962,138 2,941,682 283,589 (579,576) 3,634,239	0 20,634,417 2,895,375 7,716,615 47,016,839 5,327,319 565,142 (957,915) 6,941,971	0 28,047,191 3,935,518 10,490,195 63,916,078 7,242,114 630,973 (1,264,772) 10,172,400	13,314 19,524,378 2,739,616 7,523,041 45,837,400 5,193,681 402,006 (892,760) 8,090,174
13 Total Demand-related Costs		1,149,177,899	364,311,875	16,700,247	71,997,782	36,119,193	10,117,698	49,762,717	90,139,764	123,169,698	88,430,850
14 Less: High-voltage Revenues		17,557,725			<u> </u>					628	19,514
15 Net Demand-related Costs <69 kV)		1,111,914,945	364,311,875	16,700,247	71,997,782	36,119,193	10,117,698	49,762,717	90,139,764	123,169,070	88,411,336
Divided by: Unratcheted Demand billing us 16 (<69 kV)	nits	s	18,085,441,483 0.02014 \$	1,052,574,530 0.01587 \$	3,757,622,321	1,931,763,743 0.01870 \$	693,286,760 0.01459 \$	13,557,695 3,67044 \$	22,077,986 4.08279 \$	28,494,232 4.32260 \$	19,038,553 4.64381
17 Rate - per kWh or kW		\$	0.02014 \$ per kWh	0.01587 \$ per kWh	0.01916 \$ per kWh	0.01870 \$ per kWh	0.01459 \$ per kWh	3.67044 \$ per kW	4.08279 \$ per kW	4.32260 \$ per kW	4.64381 per kW

TEST YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2000

	Allocator	GS 801-1000 kw	GS 1001-3000 kw	GS 3001-6000 kw	GS 6001-10000 kw	GS Over 10000 kw	Fixt. Incl. Ltg	Street Lighting Dusk to Dawn	All Other <u>Lighting</u>	Railroads	Water/Sewer Pumping
ADDITIONS 1 Illinois Electricity Distribution Tax 2 System Black Start	KWH-ALL KWH-ALL	2,371,398 9,739	10,388,338 42,662	6,122,413 25,143	2,875,851 11,810	10,531,436 43,249	129,716 533	493,844 2,028	90,846 373	452,526 1,858	686,736 2,820
3 TOTAL COST OF SERVICE (Revenue-Re	elated Undistributed)	26,742,419	107,467,538	60,261,541	26,331,785	63,626,196	14,905,649	5,444,413	705,734	6,151,718	7,176,895
DEMAND-RELATED COST OF SERVIC (Reduced for Other Revenues)	Е										
4 High Voltage ESS 5 High Voltage Dist. Substations 6 High Voltage Dist. Lines 7 Distribution Substations 8 Distribution Lines 9 Line Transformers 10 Uncollectible Accounts 11 Revenue-related Illinois Electricity Distribution Tax and 12 System Black Start		1,414 5,636,471 790,897 2,304,603 14,041,799 1,591,029 115,878 (267,836) 2,381,137 26,595,391	53,980 22,277,697 3,125,956 8,794,533 53,584,524 6,071,481 63,041 (1,028,805) 10,431,000	289,678 12,547,125 1,760,584 5,027,854 30,634,391 3,471,079 34,202 (588,100) 6,147,556 59,324,370	521,341 5,529,767 775,924 2,133,794 13,001,070 1,473,107 15,210 (256,486) 2,887,661 26,081,388	10,744,037 9,993,564 1,402,274 4,007,499 24,417,431 2,766,656 29,220 (587,077) 10,574,685 63,348,290	0 3,238 454 154,233 939,732 106,478 371 (16,866) 130,249	0 11,965 1,679 584,779 3,563,021 403,714 1,349 (50,590) 495,872 5,011,789	0 133,809 18,776 50,686 308,824 34,992 276 (6,027) 91,219	0 1,074,680 150,797 634,480 3,865,843 0 (61,991) 454,385 6,118,193	0 1,272,499 178,554 584,701 3,562,546 403,660 1,942 (68,656) 689,556
14 Less: High-voltage Revenues			56,197	284,167	583,253	16,613,965					
15 Net Demand-related Costs <69 kV)		26,595,391	103,317,210	59,040,203	25,498,135	46,734,325					
Divided by: Unratcheted Demand billing ur 16 (<69 kV)	nits	<u>5,470,816</u>	<u>22,384,760</u>	12,346,201	5,428,188	9,984,179		combined with	combined with	<u>1,318,375</u>	combined with
17 Rate - per kWh or kW		\$ 4.86132 <u>per kW</u>	\$ 4.61552 S per kW	\$ 4.78205 \$ per kW	4.69736 \$ per kW	4.68084 per kW	see page 9, this schedule	below	below \$	4.64071 <u>per kW</u>	below

TEST YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2000

	Allocator	Total ICC	Single Family w/o SH	Single Family w/SH	Multi Family w/o SH	Multi Family w/SH	GS No Demand	GS <u>0-25 kw</u>	GS 26-100 kw	GS 101-400 kw	GS 401-800 kw
Uncollectible Accounts - High Voltage Share Revenue-related - High Voltage Share	HV/Total HV/Total									9 (19)	
Illinois Electricity Distribution Tax and 3 System Black Start - High Voltage Share	HV/Total									153	5,423
4 Divided by: Unratcheted High-voltage billing										144	5,094
5 units										429	12,770
7 Plus: High Voltage Demand Rate										\$ 0.33475 1.12926	
8 Total High Voltage Demand Rate								\$ 1.46401	\$ 1.46401	\$ 1.46401	\$ 1.52815
9 Unratcheted High-voltage billing units									0	<u>429</u>	12,770
10 High-voltage Revenues								\$ -	<u>\$</u>	\$ 628	\$ 19,514

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TEST YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2000

	Allocator	GS 801-1000 kw	GS 1001-3000 kw	GS 3001-6000 kw	GS 6001-10000 kw	GS Over 10000 kw	Fixt. Incl. Ltg	Street Lighting Dusk to Dawn	All Other <u>Lighting</u>	Railroads	Water/Sewer Pumping
Uncollectible Accounts - High Voltage Share Revenue-related - High Voltage Share	HV/Total HV/Total	-	102 (1,662)	492 (8,466)	965 (16,275)	14,784 (297,028)					
Illinois Electricity Distribution Tax and 3 System Black Start - High Voltage Share	HV/Total		16,852	88,500	183,238	5,350,199					
4 Divided by: Unratcheted High-voltage billing		-	15,292	80,526	167,927	5,067,954					
5 units		<u>0</u>	36,223	180,332	367,786	10,224,419					
6 7 Plus: High Voltage Demand Rate		\$ 0.41053 1.12926	\$ 0.42216 1.12926	\$ 0.44654 1.12926	\$ 0.45659 1.12926	\$ 0.49567 1.12926					
8 Total High Voltage Demand Rate		\$ 1.53979	\$ 1.55142	\$ 1.57580	\$ 1.58585	\$ 1.62493					
9 Unratcheted High-voltage billing units		<u>0</u>	36,223	180,332	367,786	10,224,419					
10 High-voltage Revenues		<u>\$</u>	\$ 56,197	\$ 284,167	\$ 583,253	16,613,965					
			HVDS RATE (based upo	on over 10,000 kW class)							
11 12			High Voltage ESS High Voltage Dist. Subst	ations		10,744,037 92,512					
13			High Voltage Dist. Lines			709,472					
14			High Voltage Demand Co	osts		11,546,021					
15			Divided by: Unratcheted	High Voltage Demand bi	illing units	10,224,419					
16			High Voltage Demand Ra	ate per kW		\$ 1.12926					

TEST YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2000

0.8361310

	Allocator	Total ICC	Single Family w/o SH	Single Family w/SH	Multi Family w/o SH	Multi Family w/SH	GS No Demand	GS <u>0-25 kw</u>	GS <u>26-100 kw</u>	GS 101-400 kw	GS 401-800 kw
CUSTOMER-RELATED COST OF SERVICE (Reduced for Other Revenues)											
1 Services 2 Customer Install. Other 3 FixtIncl. Ltg.		24,008,561 51,489,443 13,596,303	17,011,841 30,081,717	664,063 679,543	1,560,205 13,657,827	389,212 2,205,886	396,697 1,590,639	526,832 2,112,441	486,551 750,095	1,742,696 248,014	388,807 55,334
4 Billing Computation & Data Mang.5 Bill Issue & Processing6 Customer Information		137,300,371 21,925,257 13,743,592	77,351,558 12,809,410 8,029,429	1,747,364 289,363 181,384	35,119,477 5,815,782 3,645,555	5,672,174 939,311 588,796	4,090,138 677,326 424,574	5,431,890 899,520 563,854	1,928,780 319,406 200,216	637,739 105,610 66,200	142,284 23,562 14,770
7 Uncollectible Accounts 8 Revenue-Related		4,269,895 (3,172,281)	725,648 (1,717,382)	33,842 (40,892)	3,138,711 (751,804)	219,521 (114,691)	41,972 (89,035)	58,243 (119,032)	24,914 (42,229)	15,549 (31,168)	3,107 (6,900)
9 Total Customer-related Costs		263,161,139	144,292,220	3,554,666	62,185,752	9,900,211	7,132,311	9,473,747	3,667,732	2,784,640	620,963
Divided by: Monthly bills, except Pumping 10 Class kWh		-	24,692,283	557,791	11,210,889	1,810,676	1,305,660	1,733,977	615,702	203,585	45,417
11 Monthly Customer Charge		\$	5.84 \$	6.37 \$	5.55 \$	5.47 \$	5.46 \$	5.46 \$	5.96 \$	13.68 \$	13.67
- Lighting and Pumping Class on a per- kWh basis, all others a fixed monthly charge		=	per month	per month	per month	per month	per month	per month	per month	per month	per month
12 METERING SERVICES		81,801,942	42,453,510	962,918	20,344,374	3,212,168	2,316,884	7,397,316	2,815,321	1,119,119	343,418
Divided by: Monthly bills, except Lighting and Pumping Class kWh		-	24,692,283	557,791	11,210,889	1,810,676	1,305,660	1,733,977	615,702	203,585	45,417
Monthly Metering Charge, except Lighting 14 and Pumping Class kWh		<u>s</u>	i 1.72 \$	1.73 \$	1.81 \$	1.77 \$	1.77 \$	4.27 \$	4.57 \$	5.50 \$	7.56
15 TOTAL COST OF SERVICE		\$ 1,494,140,980 \$	551,057,604 \$	21,217,832 \$	154,527,908 \$	49,231,571 \$	19,566,892 \$	66,633,780 \$	96,622,817 \$	127,073,457 \$	89,395,231

TEST YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2000

	Allocator	GS 801-1000 kw	GS 1001-3000 kw	GS 3001-6000 kw	GS <u>6001-10000 kw</u>	GS Over 10000 kw	Fixt. Incl. Ltg	Street Lighting <u>Dusk to Dawn</u>	All Other Lighting	Railroads	Water/Sewer Pumping
CUSTOMER-RELATED COST OF SERVICE (Reduced for Other Revenues)											
1 Services		66,462	148,965	32,643	8,613	1 242	-	300,786	31,903	-	252,288
Customer Install. Other FixtIncl. Ltg.		9,459	20,481	4,488	1,184	1,243	26,358 13,596,303	26,066	8,962	29	9,678
4 Billing Computation & Data Mang.		24,322	3,662,368	802,532	211,743	222,199	135,555	67,026	23,044	5,295	24,886
5 Bill Issue & Processing		4,028	8,721	1,911	504	529	11,224	11,099	3,816	12	4,121
6 Customer Information		2,525	5,467	1,198	316	332	7,036	6,958	2,392	8	2,583
7 Uncollectible Accounts		508	2,582	536	144	123	4,242	122	35	-	95
8 Revenue-Related		(1,174)	(42,135)	(9,224)	(2,434)	(2,469)	(192,959)	(4,565)	(772)	(58)	(3,358)
9 Total Customer-related Costs		106,128	3,806,450	834,083	220,071	221,957	13,587,759	5,419,280	701,933	5,287	6,915,095
Divided by: Monthly bills, except Pumping											
10 Class kWh		7,761	16,813	3,688	964	1,021	=	482,239,768	88,711,232	840	672,591,581
11 Monthly Customer Charge		\$ 13.67 \$	226.40 \$	226.16 \$	228.29 \$	217.39	\$	0.01124 \$	0.00791 \$	6.29 \$	0.01028
- Lighting and Pumping Class on a per-											
kWh basis, all others a fixed monthly charge		per month	per month	per month	per month	per month		per kWh	per kWh	per month	per kWh
12 METERING SERVICES		40,900	287,681	103,087	30,326	55,949	-	25,132	3,801	28,238	261,800
Divided by: Monthly bills, except Lighting											
13 and Pumping Class kWh		7,761	16,813	3,688	964	1,021	=	482,239,768	88,711,232	840	672,591,581
Monthly Metering Charge, except Lighting											
14 and Pumping Class kWh		\$ 5.27	5 17.11 \$	27.95 \$	31.46 \$	54.80	<u>\$</u>	0.00005 \$	0.00004 \$	33.62 \$	0.00039
15 TOTAL COST OF SERVICE		\$ 26,742,419 \$	5 107,467,538 \$	60,261,541 \$	26,331,785 \$	63,626,196 \$	14,905,649 \$	5,444,413 \$	705,734 \$	6,151,718 \$	7,176,895
		± 20,7 12,117	10.,107,000	55,501,511	==,551,765	52,020,170	2.,,000,010	2,771,115	. 35,751	υ,υ1,/10	.,.,0,0,0

TEST YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2000

0.8361310

	Allocator	Total ICC	Single Family w/o SH	Single Family w/SH	Multi Family w/o SH	Multi Family <u>w/SH</u>	GS No Demand	GS <u>0-25 kw</u>	GS <u>26-100 kw</u>	GS 101-400 kw	GS 401-800 kw
REVENUES AS BILLED											
 Demand Rate Multiplied by: Demand Billing Units 		\$	0.02015 18,085,441,483	0.01586 1,052,574,530	\$ 0.01916 \$ 3,757,622,321	0.01870 \$ 1,931,763,743	0.01459 \$ 693,286,760	3.67043 \$ 13,557,695	4.08278 \$ 22,077,986	4.32260 S 28,494,232	4.64381 19,038,553
3 Demand Revenues		<u>\$</u>	364,421,646	16,693,832	\$ 71,996,044 \$	36,123,982 \$	10,115,054 \$	49,762,570 \$	90,139,560 \$	123,169,167	88,411,423
4 High-Voltage Demand Rate 5 Multiplied by: High-Voltage Billing Units		\$	- 5 		s - s	- \$	- \$	1.46401 \$	1.46401 \$	1.46401 S 429	1.52815 12,770
6 High-Voltage Demand Revenues		<u>\$</u>	<u> </u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u> §	<u>-</u> §	- \$	<u>-</u> §	<u>-</u> §	628	5 19,514
7 Monthly Customer Charge 8 Multiplied by: Monthly Bills		\$	5.84 S 24,692,283	6.37 557,791	\$ 5.55 \$ 11,210,889	5.47 \$ 1,810,676	5.46 \$ 1,305,660	5.46 \$ 1,733,977	5.96 \$ 615,702	13.67 S 203,585	3 13.67 45,417
9 Customer Charge Revenues		<u>\$</u>	144,202,933	3,553,129	\$ 62,220,434 \$	9,904,398 \$	7,128,904 \$	9,467,514 \$	3,669,584 \$	2,783,007	620,850
10 Monthly Meter Charge11 Multiplied by: Monthly Bills		\$ 	1.72 S 24,692,283	5 1.73 557,791	\$ 1.81 \$ 11,210,889	1.77 \$ 1,810,676	1.77 \$ 1,305,660	4.27 \$ 1,733,977	4.57 \$ 615,702	5.50 S 203,585	7.56 45,417
12 Metering Charge Revenues		<u>\$</u>	42,470,727	964,978	\$ 20,291,709 \$	3,204,897 \$	2,311,018 \$	7,404,082 \$	2,813,758 \$	1,119,718	343,353
13 Total Revenues as Billed14 Total Revenues Allocated	<u> </u>	1,494,140,969 \$ 1,494,140,980	551,095,305 551,057,604	21,211,939 21,217,832	\$ 154,508,187 \$ 154,527,908	49,233,276 49,231,571	19,554,976 \$ 19,566,892	66,634,167 \$ 66,633,780	96,622,902 \$ 96,622,817	127,072,520 S 127,073,457	89,395,140 89,395,231
15 Excess/(deficit)	<u>.s</u>	(11) \$	37,701	(5,893)	\$ (19,721) \$	1,705 \$	(11,917) \$	387 \$	84 \$	(937)	(91)

TEST YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2000

	Allocator	G 801-10		GS 1001-3000 kw	GS 3001-6000 kw	GS 6001-10000 kw	GS <u>Over 10000 kw</u>	Fixt. Incl. Ltg	Street Lighting Dusk to Dawn	All Other <u>Lighting</u>	Railroads	Water/Sewer Pumping
REVENUES AS BILLED												
Demand Rate Multiplied by: Demand Billing Units		\$	4.86132 \$ 5,470,816	4.61551 22,384,760	\$ 4.78206 12,346,201	\$ 4.69736 5,428,188	\$ 4.68084 9,984,179	see page 9, this schedule	\$ 0.01124 482,239,768	\$ 0.00791 88,711,232	\$ 4.64071 S 1,318,375	\$ 0.01028 672,591,581
3 Demand Revenues		\$ 2	26,595,387 \$	103,317,084	\$ 59,040,274	\$ 25,498,153	\$ 46,734,344		\$ 5,420,375	\$ 701,706	\$ 6,118,196	\$ 6,914,241
4 High-Voltage Demand Rate 5 Multiplied by: High-Voltage Billing Units		\$	1.53979 \$	1.55142 36,223	\$ 1.57580 180,332	\$ 1.58585 367,786	\$ 1.62493 10,224,419	\$ - 	\$ - <u>-</u>	\$ - -	\$ - :	\$ - -
6 High-Voltage Demand Revenues		\$	<u>-</u> §	56,197	\$ 284,167	\$ 583,253	\$ 16,613,965	\$	<u> </u>	<u>-</u>	<u> </u>	<u>-</u>
7 Monthly Customer Charge 8 Multiplied by: Monthly Bills		\$	13.67 \$ 7,761	226.40 16,813	\$ 226.15 3,688	\$ 228.29 964	\$ 217.40 1,021	\$ - -			\$ 6.30 840	
9 Customer Charge Revenues		\$	106,093 \$	3,806,463	\$ 834,041	\$ 220,072	\$ 221,965	\$			\$ 5,292	
10 Monthly Meter Charge11 Multiplied by: Monthly Bills		\$	5.27 \$ 7,761	17.11 16,813	\$ 27.95 3,688	\$ 31.46 964	\$ 54.80 1,021	\$ - -	\$ 0.00005 482,239,768	\$ 0.00004 88,711,232	\$ 33.62 840	\$ 0.00039 672,591,581
12 Metering Charge Revenues		\$	40,900 \$	287,670	\$ 103,080	\$ 30,327	\$ 55,951	\$ -	\$ 24,112	\$ 3,548	\$ 28,241	\$ 262,311
13 Total Revenues as Billed14 Total Revenues Allocated			26,742,381 \$ 26,742,419	107,467,414 107,467,538	\$ 60,261,562 60,261,541	\$ 26,331,806 26,331,785	\$ 63,626,226 63,626,196	\$ 14,905,147 14,905,649	\$ 5,444,487 5,444,413	\$ 705,254 705,734	\$ 6,151,729 6,151,718	7,176,552 7,176,895
15 Excess/(deficit)		\$	(39) \$	(124)	\$ 21	\$ 21	\$ 30	\$ (502)	\$ 74	\$ (480)	\$ 11	\$ (343)

TEST YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2000

FIXTURE-INCLUDED LIGHTING

1 Staff COSS Total Costs allocated Divided by: Company COSS Total
2 Cost allocated 18,312,538
3 Adjustment Factor 0.81396

	Charge per Fixture Municipal Street Lighting:	Billing Units	Co. Proposed Rate		Adjustment Factor	S	Staff Rate]	Revenues
	88-					_		-	
4	Mercury Vapor 100 watts	252,558	\$	5.05	0.81396	\$	4.11	\$	1,038,013
5	175 watts	649,128		5.62	0.81396	\$	4.57		2,966,515
6	250 watts	104,106		6.21	0.81396	\$	5.05		525,735
7	400 watts	118,194		7.43	0.81396	\$	6.05		715,074
8	High Pressure Sodium 70 watts	16,662	\$	5.59	0.81396	\$	4.54	\$	75,645
9	100 watts	189,972		5.47	0.81396	\$	4.45		845,375
10	150 watts	188,640		5.86	0.81396	\$	4.77		899,813
11	250 watts	131,922		6.92	0.81396	\$	5.63		742,721
12	400 watts	25,020		8.12	0.81396	\$	6.61		165,382
13	1,000 watts	1,644		17.56	0.81396	\$	14.29		23,493
14	Special Equipment Bracket <8 feet	905,808	\$	2.64	0.81396	\$	2.15	\$	1,947,487
15	Bracket >8 feet	622,254		5.37	0.81396	\$	4.37		2,719,250
	Luminaire Post Top (Early								
16	American/Contemporary)	51,426	\$	2.57	0.81396	\$	2.09	\$	107,480
17	Luminaire Acorn	4,782		6.98	0.81396	\$	5.68	·	27,162
		·							ĺ
	Charge per Fixture Private Outdoor								
	Lighting:								
18	Mercury Vapor 175 watts	136,799	\$	6.07	0.81396	\$	4.94	\$	675,787
19	400 watts	47,865		8.25	0.81396	\$	6.72		321,653
	High Pressure Sodium Flood								
20	100 watts	26,930	\$	7.85	0.81396	\$	6.39	\$	172,083
21	250 watts	121,142	Ψ	8.67	0.81396	\$	7.06	Ψ	855,263
21	250 watts	121,142		0.07	0.01370	Ψ	7.00		033,203
	High Pressure Sodium Conventional -								
22	100 watts	5,373	\$	6.06	0.81396	\$	4.93	\$	26,489
23	400 watts	10,464	Ψ	6.43	0.81396	\$	5.23	Ψ	54,727
2.4		2 (10 (00						¢	14.005.145
24		3,610,689						3	14,905,147